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Abstract 
 
We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning 
underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between 
December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer’s investment-banking 
relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending relationships, and the 
endogeneity of analyst behavior and the bank’s decision to provide analyst coverage. We find no 
evidence that aggressive analyst recommendations or recommendation upgrades increased their 
bank’s probability of winning an underwriting mandate after controlling for analysts’ career 
concerns and bank reputation. Our findings might be interpreted as suggesting that bank and 
analyst credibility are central to resolving information frictions associated with securities 
offerings.  
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The U.S. securities industry currently faces perhaps the strongest challenge to its integrity since 
the Great Depression. Particularly troubling are the allegations that investment bank research analysts 
systematically sacrificed objectivity, and thereby misled the investing public, to attract securities 
underwriting mandates for their banks. Recent work by Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and 
Womack (1999), and Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) lends weight to these allegations in the sense that 
analysts are shown to be more optimistic towards firms taken public by their bank.  
Notwithstanding this correlation, there is no systematic evidence that analyst behavior influenced their 
bank’s likelihood of attracting an underwriting mandate.1 Moreover, most existing research focuses on 
initial public offerings of equity. While IPOs are the most lucrative segment of the securities underwriting 
business and sometimes mark the beginning of a banking relationship, they are a relatively small part of 
overall capital market activity. The bulk of this activity involves firms that are frequent participants in the 
capital markets, particularly for raising debt. Finally, the 1990s witnessed profound changes in the 
competitive landscape as commercial banks incrementally shed Glass-Steagall constraints on their ability 
to compete for securities underwriting mandates. By most accounts, commercial banks exploited their 
larger capital accounts to win underwriting mandates. Investment banks generally had smaller balance 
sheets but more reputation capital derived from their long experience with capital market transactions.  
Against this background, we investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of 
banks being awarded underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold 
between December 1993 and June 2002. Examining both debt and equity offerings enables us to compare 
settings (i.e., equity transactions) in which the intermediary’s reputation capital is likely to be a central 
consideration for the issuing firm to those in which it is perhaps less important. Further, paying careful 
attention to a variety of strategic considerations facing both investment and commercial banks provides 
considerable nuance to our understanding of the analyst’s role in attracting underwriting mandates. 
                                                           
1 Recent work by Cliff and Denis (2003) suggests, however, that the probability of switching underwriters between the IPO and 
subsequent equity offerings is related to analyst behavior. 
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Among other things, we suggest that it is useful to think of systematic deviations from objectivity in 
research as a means of trading on (or liquidating) one’s reputation capital. We then explore whether such 
behavior was a competitive response to commercial bank entry during the sample period.  
We find no evidence that analyst recommendation behavior favorably influenced whether banks won 
either debt or equity mandates. Far more important appears to be the strength of the bank’s relationship 
with the issuer as measured by the share of the issuer’s past securities offerings (both debt and equity) 
underwritten by the bank, and to a somewhat lesser extent the strength of prior lending relationships.2  
Examining the determinants of analyst recommendation behavior before equity offerings, we find 
evidence that more reputable analysts and banks were associated with less aggressively optimistic 
recommendations. We interpret these findings as a reflection of career concerns among analysts and the 
certification function of investment banks (Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)).  
The informational frictions that create demand for investment-bank certification are less severe among 
debt offerings and thus pose a weaker reputational barrier to entry in this market segment. Other things 
equal, incentives to preserve reputation capital should then be less constraining for banks that specialize in 
debt underwriting, implying a greater willingness to test the limits of investor credulity. It also follows 
naturally that commercial banks entered the securities underwriting business (and had their greatest 
competitive impact) in the debt markets.3 Interpreting aggressive analyst behavior as a means of 
liquidating reputation capital, less reputable investment banks competed more aggressively on this 
dimension but it was a losing proposition. Commercial banks gained considerable market share at their 
expense.  
                                                           
2 There is a substantial literature on commercial bank lending relationships (e.g., Boot and Thakor (2000), Diamond (1991), 
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)). There is much less theory to guide an empirical analysis of investment-banking relationships 
(but see Anand and Galetovic (2002) and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2003)). 
3 Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) find that commercial bank entry is associated with a decline in debt underwriting spreads 
but not in equity underwriting spreads. The effect is strongest among lower-rated and smaller debt issues. Gande et al. (1997) 
provide evidence that commercial banks brought a larger proportion of small debt offerings to market during the January 1993-
March 1995 period and that more reputable banks (evidenced by market share) obtain lower yields for borrowers. Similarly, 
Livingston and Miller (2000) report slightly lower gross spreads and lower yields obtained by more reputable banks. After the 
first quarter of 1997, when the Federal Reserve Board relaxed constraints on cross-marketing and information flows between 
commercial banks and their ‘Section 20’ affiliates, Roten and Mullineaux (2003) find little evidence that commercial banks and 
investment banks differed in their underwriting performance. 
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Thus, in broad terms we believe the evidence favors the interpretation that deregulation of 
commercial banks coupled with enormous deal flow in the late 1990s upset an equilibrium in which 
market forces (i.e., reputational concerns) moderated the longstanding conflict of interest between 
investment banking and research. Interpreting aggressive behavior among analysts (and its subsequent 
fallout) as liquidation of reputation capital, the evidence suggests that it did not serve banks’ interests in 
the short run and we contend it is therefore not likely to characterize long-run equilibrium in the industry.  
Our analysis is complicated by several factors. First, a favorable research report, though surely of 
value to a potential issuer,4 is not the only consideration in selecting an underwriter. In short, decisions at 
the transaction level are made within the context of banking relationships that are complex, vary through 
time, and are a relatively unexplored phenomenon. Among other things, we show that bank research 
coverage decisions are strategic and heavily influenced by past dealings with the issuer. Second, a large 
literature documents systematic positive biases in earnings forecasts (Brown et al. (1985), Stickel (1990), 
Abarbanell (1991), Dreman and Barry (1995), Chopra (1998), and others), which in part appear driven by 
career concerns (Hong and Kubik (2003) and Hong et al. (2000)). Analyst research is an experience good 
and thus individual analysts have incentive to build, and maintain, reputation for objectivity and forecast 
accuracy. The private incentive to protect one’s reputation and the quasi rents it confers provide a 
countervailing force against incentives to sacrifice objectivity (Graham (1999)). In short, there is ample 
reason to believe that analyst behavior reflects at least in part a trade-off and so cannot be treated as an 
exogenous determinant of a bank’s chances of winning an underwriting mandate. 
We address these problems by empirically modeling the bank’s coverage decision and analyst 
behavior under the assumption that each is embedded in a banking relationship that evolves over time. 
Their joint evolution, in turn, conditions the likelihood that an issuing firm grants an underwriting 
mandate to a particular bank. We develop this structural econometric model in Section I. We use data 
                                                           
4 The perceived value of coverage could have many sources. For instance, Chan et al. (2003) find that analysts in the U.S. help 
firms avoid negative earnings surprises. 
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from six principal sources (SDC, I/B/E/S, Dealscan, 13f filings, Institutional Investor magazine, and 
news reports) to estimate the model. Section II describes our data and coding choices in some detail. Our 
empirical results are in Section III. Section IV concludes. 
I. The Empirical Model5 
A. Economic Structure of the Model 
In this section we outline the economic structure of the model and provide an overview of the key 
variables. We defer precise specification of the variables to subsequent sections.  
Our central focus is on the determinants of a bank j’s likelihood of receiving an issuing firm i’s 
underwriting mandate at time t. The probability model takes the general form: 
 Pr(bank j leads firm i’s deal at time t) = fL(analyst behavior, XL)  (1) 
where XL is a matrix of explanatory variables. By ‘analyst behavior’ we mean either the level of bank j’s 
analyst’s recommendation for firm i’s stock, or the change in that recommendation. In either case, we 
normalize by the recommendation behavior of other banks. Thus, we test whether a bank is more likely to 
win an underwriting mandate if its analyst provided a relatively bullish recommendation for the issuer’s 
stock, or recently upgraded the issuer’s stock more aggressively than did other banks. We control for the 
reputation of the bank’s analyst, the bank’s broader reputation within the debt and equity markets, its 
lending capacity, and the strength of the bank’s relationship with the issuer. Other things equal, we expect 
a higher probability of success from a more reputable bank that maintains a strong relationship with the 
issuer. Including proxies for lending relationships enables us to examine allegations that commercial 
banks successfully tied lending facilities to opportunities for underwriting capital market transactions.6  
It is alleged that investment bankers pressured analysts to provide more favorable recommendations 
for potential issuers. However, research is an experience good so analysts have incentive to build and 
                                                           
5 We are grateful to Bill Greene for helpful comments and advice on our empirical modeling strategy. 
6 Because we cannot observe the fees quoted by banks that subsequently fail to win an underwriting mandate, we do not 
attempt to control for price competition. However, it is well known that cross-sectional variation in percentage fees paid is 
minimal. 
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protect reputation for meaningful recommendations. Thus if analysts are self-interested, they should 
weigh career concerns against any immediate expected payoffs cooperation with investment bankers 
might bring. In short, treating analyst behavior as an exogenous determinant of the bank’s probability of 
attracting an underwriting mandate is likely to bias inference. We address this ‘simultaneity’ problem by 
obtaining an instrumental variable or fitted value for analyst behavior from the following model: 
 Analyst behavior at time t = fA(XA) (2) 
XA is a matrix of explanatory variables that control for the expected cost to the analyst of jeopardizing her 
reputation and the benefit she expects to receive (or equivalently, the amount of pressure the investment 
bankers put on her to bias her recommendation upward). We proxy for the former using various measures 
of analyst reputation. Absent data on bonuses paid to research analysts, we control for the latter with 
proxies for the bank’s expected underwriting profits. We contend that profit opportunities are tied to the 
strength of the banking relationship with the issuing firm, the issuer’s general capacity for generating fee 
income within this relationship, and the fee potential in the deal at hand. We also control for time-
variation in the size of the potential pool of ‘side payments’ bankers might use to gain analyst 
cooperation, based on changes in market-wide deal flows (such as the ‘hot’ market of the late 1990s). 
A bank’s relationship with an issuer has potentially competing effects on analyst behavior. On the one 
hand, a bank and its analyst might sacrifice reputation capital to protect a rent stream associated with a 
strong relationship. Conversely, if an existing banking relationship presents a barrier to entry, there is less 
incentive for a reputable bank maintaining a strong relationship with the issuer to offer an aggressive 
recommendation. Competition via more aggressive analyst recommendations would then be the province 
of less reputable banks seeking to build relationships with issuing firms.  
If every sample bank covered every sample issuer at the time of every sample transaction, we could 
estimate (1) and (2) as a system of two simultaneous equations with the dichotomous dependent variable 
in equation (1) the only non-standard feature (Maddala (1983), pp. 244-245). However, universal 
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coverage is not a feature of the marketplace, and so we observe analyst behavior – and its effect on 
lead underwriter choice – only if bank j covers firm i’s stock at time t. Moreover, the selection criterion 
leading to this sample truncation is likely non-random: given resource scarcity it is plausible, and indeed 
likely, that bank research directors are strategic in their coverage decisions. We address this ‘selectivity’ 
problem by modeling the coverage decision explicitly as follows: 
 Pr(bank j covers firm i at time t) = fC(XC) (3) 
where XC is a matrix of explanatory variables that control for the strength of the bank’s relationship with 
the issuer, the bank’s reputation, and various characteristics of the issuing firm that might attract 
coverage. Commercial banks were relatively late entrants to the equity markets and generally provided 
less equity research during the sample period. Thus we allow their coverage decision criteria to differ 
from those of investment banks. 
B. Econometric Structure of the Model 
If bank j’s analyst covers firm i, we observe both the probability model for winning the underwriting 
mandate in equation (1) and the analyst behavior model in equation (2). Otherwise, we do not observe (2) 
and we observe only a modified form of (1) that relates the probability of winning the underwriting 
mandate to the explanatory variables XL but not to analyst behavior. Suppressing subscripts for i, j, and t, 
the econometric model is: 
Coverage case: 
 0 if      ** >



++=
+=
C
LALLLL
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uyy
uy
δβ
β
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X
 (4) 
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 0 if      
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=
C
LNCLLNCL
A y
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Xβ  (5) 
where stars indicate unobserved latent variables whose realizations are observed as binary outcomes. 
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Specifically, *Ly  is a latent variable measuring the propensity of issuer i to hire bank j as lead 
underwriter, observed as 1=Ly  if 0
* >Ly  and 0=Ly  if 0
* ≤Ly . 
*
Cy  is a latent variable measuring bank 
j’s propensity to cover firm i’s stock at time t which we observe with realizations 
 
00
01
*
*
≤=
>+==
CC
CCCCC
yify
uyify Xβ
 (6) 
Ay  is a continuous, observed variable measuring analyst behavior, and uk (k = L, A, C, LNC) are error 
terms whose distributions are described shortly.  
Although the XL matrix in the two lead-bank equations in (4) and (5) remains the same, we do not 
constrain the two coefficient vectors LNCL ββ  and  to be equal. This enables us to test the hypothesis that 
in the absence of coverage and thus of strategic analyst behavior, variables such as prior relationships 
have a significantly stronger effect on a bank’s probability of winning underwriting mandates. 
C. Estimation 
Equations (4)-(6) form a simultaneous-equations system with endogenous switching (Maddala (1983), 
Ch. 8 and especially sections 8.3, 8.6 and Model 1 on p. 241). The switching criterion is given in (6), 
which determines whether we observe system (4) or (5). Estimation is carried out through the following 
two-step procedure. Consider first the coverage case ( 1=Cy ). In step 1, we estimate the determinants of 
analyst behavior in reduced-form, including all variables in XA and XL. Since the model is recursive ( *Ly  
depends on Ay  but not vice versa) it is not strictly necessary to include XL when estimating the first-step 
equation.7 To ensure that the first-step estimates are consistent, we account for truncation due to non-
coverage. Heckman (1979) shows that the errors in a truncated sample are not zero mean, and so OLS 
yields biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. We therefore estimate the first-step coefficients using 
the MLE version of Heckman’s sample selection correction using equation (6).  
                                                           
7 In principle, *Ly  and Ay could be jointly determined if the analyst’s expectation of her bank winning the mandate influences 
her willingness to jeopardize her reputation by inflating the issuer’s stock recommendation. Empirically, we find a negative 
relation between Ay  and )(
*
LyE but this is not statistically significant. We thus focus on the recursive model outlined here. 
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Step 2 estimates the determinants of a given bank winning a given underwriting mandate, 
replacing the analyst behavior variable Ay  with the fitted value Ayˆ  from step 1. Again, we account for 
truncation by adjusting the probit likelihood function for truncation bias, 0)1|( ≠=CL yuE  (see Van de 
Ven and Van Pragg (1981) for the derivation of the joint likelihood function). If the estimates from step 1 
are consistent, and the equation system is identified, the second step yields consistent estimates for 
( LL δβ ˆ,ˆ ). Since the second step involves a generated regressor (the predicted analyst behavior from the 
first step) estimated with sampling error, the second-step covariance matrix is not consistent. Consistent 
standard errors are obtained using the procedure derived in Murphy and Topel (1985, Section 5). 
In the absence of coverage, 0=Ay , and so we simply estimate a single-equation probit model of 
system (5), again corrected for truncation since 0)0|( ≠=CLNC yuE .  
Finally, because our unit of observation is a securities transaction, the model for the probability of a 
given bank winning an underwriting mandate conditions on information for both the winning bank (or, for 
co-leads, banks) and the banks that unsuccessfully competed for the mandate. Thus, for each transaction, 
we construct a data panel containing conditioning information for both winning and non-winning banks. 
To keep the estimation sample to a manageable size, we restrict the set of non-winning banks to those that 
were most ‘active’ over the period as defined in the next section. Note that our probability model can be 
thought of as a generalization of the binary models that have been estimated to explain why some firms 
switch underwriters after their IPO (e.g. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001)), in the sense that we allow 
firms not just to switch but to choose any underwriter from among our set of sample banks.8 
                                                           
8 An obvious alternative approach would be to estimate a multinomial choice model where each issuing firm chooses its 
underwriter from a slate of competing banks. However, a selectivity-adjusted multinomial choice model has not yet been 
developed. Therefore, estimates from existing multinomial choice models in our setting are biased due to the non-random 
nature of the decision to provide analyst coverage.  
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II. Data 
A. The Sample of Securities Offerings 
Between January 1, 1988 and June 30, 2002, Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Corporation reports 
36,173 debt and equity offerings, after excluding transactions by firms classified as SIC 6000-6999 
(financial institutions etc) and SIC 9000-9999 (government agencies etc). The transactions or ‘deals’ 
range from IPOs to offerings by seasoned firms, and include both public and private offerings and firms. 
We use the full sample period to generate a variety of variables, including prior relationships between 
issuers and banks. The distribution of different types of offerings is reported in Table I. Public common 
stock offerings, public non-convertible debt, and private non-convertible debt each account for around 
one third of the number of sample transactions but public debt dominates in dollar terms.  
Many issuers are related to each other so we form ‘corporate families’ on the basis of SDC’s ‘ultimate 
parent CUSIP’ identifier. This allows us to control for prior relationships between a given bank and any 
member of a corporate family. For example, AT&T Corp is the parent of AT&T Wireless, Lucent 
Technologies, Teligent, etc. Transactions involving any of these ‘subsidiaries’ are grouped under AT&T. 
Thus when Lucent went public in 1996, we condition the probability of a bank receiving the mandate on 
the strength of its relationship with the AT&T ‘family’ in the prior T years. The 36,173 deals in 1988-
2002 involve 15,306 unique firms reflecting 12,470 unique corporate families.  
I/B/E/S tracks analyst recommendations only from late 1993, restricting the estimation period in the 
econometric model to December 1, 1993 through June 30, 2002. We further exclude a) any issuer or 
family of issuers that never hired one of our sample banks (see below) as a lead manager between 1988 
and June 2002; and b) purely foreign issuers or families of issuers. The first restriction eliminates small 
deals managed by small banks which presumably were not being fought over by our (mostly large) 
sample banks. The second restriction is imposed to keep the data collection manageable. This leaves an 
estimation-period sample of 16,625 transactions, shown in the final two columns of Table I, involving 
6,821 unique firms and 5,472 unique corporate families. 
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B. Sample Underwriters 
Estimating a bank’s probability of winning the underwriting mandate for a particular offering requires 
data for both the winning bank and its competitors. We keep the size of the dataset manageable by 
focusing on the 16 most-active debt and equity lead (or joint lead) underwriters as measured by the 
nominal proceeds from deals completed during the 2000-2002 period.9 Each bank is treated as a potential 
competitor for each deal in the estimation period (subject to regulatory constraints described below). 
Many of the sample banks are the product of mergers (or demergers) and acquisitions during the sample 
period, summarized in Figure 1. The predecessors of the 16 sample banks also are treated as potential 
competitors for a deal prior to joining forces with one of the final 16. For example, from the perspective 
of 1988, there were up to 41 independent sample banks in potential competition for each deal. 
Table II reports summary statistics for the 16 banks to which we confine our attention. To compute 
the banks’ market shares over the 1988-2002 period, we allocate to each bank the proceeds underwritten 
by its predecessor banks. For example, the $323 billion in total capital underwritten assigned to JP 
Morgan Chase includes the underwriting mandates granted to JP Morgan, Chase, Chemical Bank, 
Hambrecht & Quist, and Manufacturers Hanover during the sample period. The top five underwriters 
(Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Smith Barney) 
each held at least an 11% market share in the debt and equity markets, accounting in aggregate for 63.5% 
of the dollar amount of capital raised during the sample period.  
Together, the 16 sample banks and their predecessors underwrote $1,181 billion in equity and $2,524 
billion in debt (in nominal terms) over the sample period – more than 90% of underwriting activity in 
either market. Their combined market share ranged from 80.7% in 1988 to 96.4% in 1990, falling below 
90% only twice, in 1988 and 1989. Excluding banks other than our final 16 and their predecessors 
therefore results in little loss of data but significant economies in coding banking relationships and in the 
probability model estimation. 
                                                           
9 We exclude Bank One (whose debt market share places it above some of our sample banks) for lack of equity analysts. 
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The sample includes commercial banks whose ability to compete for public offers historically 
was restricted by the Glass-Steagall Act and regulatory rules. We account for this by treating a 
commercial bank as capable of competing for a public offering mandate prior to the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act only if it had a so called ‘Section 20’ subsidiary with Tier II securities underwriting authority 
granted by the Federal Reserve Board.10 Figure 1 documents the dates when sample commercial banks 
received such approval. Tier II authority was not required for private offers, so we treat every sample 
bank as being in competition for every private deal. On average, 24.3 banks competed for a given deal. 
As mentioned earlier, we exclude from the sample any issuer or family of issuers which never hired 
one of our sample banks as lead manager between 1988 and June 2002. Among the remaining 16,625 
mandates, 2,204 were won by non-sample banks, such as Banque National de Paris or a regional 
underwriter. Thus, non-sample banks are in the sample when they won a deal, but they are not treated as 
competing for any mandates they did not win.  
C. Prior Investment-Banking Relationships 
The lag between the 1988 beginning of the sample period and the 1993 beginning of the estimation 
period provides us with at least five years of prior data for measuring investment-banking relationships. 
Our main proxy for the strength of an issuer’s relationship with a particular bank focuses on the bank’s 
share of the client’s previous mandates, coded as follows. For firm i at time t, we determine whether it (or 
any member of its corporate family) extended an underwriting mandate to bank j or any of j’s 
predecessors (but not j’s successors). If so, we accumulate the proceeds from the deals that bank j 
managed for firm i in the preceding T=1…5 years, and divide by the total raised by the firm to reduce the 
impact of differences in scale across firms. This measure ranges from zero (no relationship) to one (when 
the issuer maintained an exclusive banking relationship). It is computed separately for debt and equity 
deals, and for any sample bank that was a potential competitor for the mandate at time t.  
In the simplest cases, such as Goldman Sachs, the implementation of the algorithm is straightforward. 
                                                           
10 In some instances debt and equity approval were granted at different times. 
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Cases involving one or more acquisitions are more complex. Bank of America, easily the most 
complicated in the sample, illustrates the complexities involved. In October 1997, BofA acquired 
Robertson Stephens and, from our perspective, inherited Robertson Stephens’ history of relationships 
with a particular firm i. Their joint history then conditions the probability of BofA winning any future 
mandate of firm i. In June 1998, Robertson Stephens was sold to BankBoston (which was acquired by 
Fleet in 1999) in advance of BofA’s September 1998 merging with NationsBanc. From this point forward, 
the mandate history of Robertson Stephens, including those received while owned by BofA, belongs to 
BankBoston (and then Fleet). But we also assume that the probability of BofA receiving a future mandate 
is conditional on the Robertson Stephens mandate history up to the time it was sold to BankBoston. This 
element of ‘double-counting’ reflects our inability to trace precisely the extent to which relationships 
remain exclusive to Robertson Stephens.11  
Table III provides summary statistics for our relationship proxy at the maximum 5-year horizon used 
in our econometric model. (Subsequent econometric results are somewhat stronger if we use shorter 
horizons, indicating that more ‘recent’ relationships carry more weight, but our qualitative conclusions are 
unaffected.) Results are reported separately for debt and equity transactions, and partitioned by whether or 
not the bank won the underwriting mandate and whether or not it provided research coverage for the 
issuer at the time of the deal in question. Banks providing research coverage that won equity mandates 
underwrote on average 46.3% of the issuer’s equity proceeds raised during the prior five years. The 
strength of underwriting relationships appears less important among debt offerings as evidenced by the 
25.9% share of debt proceeds underwritten by the average winner of an issuer’s debt mandate. In general, 
winners of a mandate in a particular market (debt or equity) had stronger relationships with the issuer on 
both the debt and equity dimension.  
                                                           
11 In June 1997 NationsBanc acquired Montgomery Securities. Thus in addition to ‘inheriting’ relationships via its short-lived 
ownership of Robertson Stephens, Bank of America inherited relationships from Montgomery and NationsBanc at the time of 
the merger. On September 21, 1998, in the wake of the merger, Montgomery’s founder, Thomas Weisel, resigned from 
Montgomery, founded Thomas Weisel Partners and subsequently raided a large fraction of Montgomery’s banking 
professionals. Relationships held by Montgomery prior to Weisel’s resignation are coded as being inherited by Weisel Partners, 
but similar to the ‘double-counting’ in the Robertson Stephens case, we also count them as being held by BofA. 
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D. ‘Paying to Play’ 
The more active firms in our sample (corporate families carrying out more than 20 transactions during 
the sample period) spread their transactions across 12.8 different lead underwriters on average (median: 
12). This represents a marked decline in the exclusivity of banking relationships by comparison to earlier 
periods (Baker (1990), Eccles and Crane (1988)). The decline of exclusive relationships can be traced in 
part to the weakening and ultimate repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act during the sample period. From the 
late 1980s the largest commercial banks bought or built first debt and then equity underwriting capacity in 
Section 20 subsidiaries. Throughout the early and mid 1990s the securities industry criticized commercial 
banks for using government-insured deposits to subsidize bids for underwriting mandates with offers of 
low-margin lending facilities. By 2001, ‘paying to play’ became commonplace as issuers in both the 
public debt and equity markets demanded credit lines from banks bidding for underwriting business 
(Drucker and Puri (2003)).  
We control for this change in the competitive landscape by constructing a measure of prior lending 
relationships similarly to the underwriting relationship measures outlined in the previous section. The 
underlying loan data are derived from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, excluding non-
U.S. borrowers and firms in SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial institutions etc) and 9000-9999 (government 
agencies etc). LPC lists 15,273 borrowers between 1988 and June 2002, taking out 49,459 loan facilities 
totaling $8 trillion. We are able to hand-match 6,701 LPC borrowers by name (LPC’s principal firm 
identifier) to our sample of SDC issuers. These account for 30,068 of the 49,459 loan facilities, or 60.79% 
by number and 79.92% by loan amount.12 In the case of syndicated loans, each bank acting in a leading 
role (i.e. ‘arranger’) is credited with the corresponding fraction of the loan.13 
As Table III shows, the average winning bank had relatively weak lending relationships with equity 
                                                           
12 Of the remaining 8,572 borrowers not matched to SDC, 1,678 can be matched to the CRSP master tape, so we can 
definitively rule out that they are in SDC (since we can merge SDC and CRSP without a problem). This leaves unmatched 
6,894 borrowers taking out 14,344 loans for $1.3 trillion (16.25% of the total). It is possible that some of these are in fact in 
SDC, but given the above numbers, we are confident that we have captured the vast majority of lending activity. 
13 Yasuda (2003) shows that lending relationships are strongest at the ‘arranger’ level, though widening the scope to include 
‘lead managers’ leaves her results unaffected. 
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issuers, in sharp contrast to the importance of prior equity underwriting relationships. For instance, 
winning banks providing coverage arranged only 2.4% of the average equity issuer’s loans in the prior 5 
years. Among debt issuers, lending relationships are somewhat more concentrated, peaking at 7.4% 
among winning banks not providing coverage. Not coincidentally, Table III also confirms the well-known 
fact that commercial banks enjoyed considerable success in the debt markets. Of course, prior lending 
relationships need not proxy solely for ‘tied’ loans. Yasuda (2003) shows that bond issuers that hire their 
lenders as underwriter obtain keener prices, suggesting that lenders having greater certification capacity. 
Schenone (2003) finds similar evidence for IPO firms. 
Commercial banks’ larger balance sheets almost certainly provided greater capacity for sweetening 
bids for underwriting mandates by including a loan. Thus, we also compute each bank’s share of the 
corporate loan market in the calendar year before the deal in question, based on loans arranged, as a proxy 
for their capacity to sweeten their bids or tie lending to capital market transactions. Descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table III. Whether or not they provided coverage, large lenders more often failed in the 
competition for equity deals while succeeding in competition for debt mandates. 
E. Supplemental Relationship Measures 
The sample period witnessed a high frequency of bank consolidation and associated disruptions to 
bank-issuer relationships. We therefore supplement our transactions-based relationship variables with 
measures of banks holding equity stakes in potential issuers (which might cement relationships), key-
banker movements (who might take relationships with them as they move to a new bank), and bank 
mergers (which might cause issuers to re-evaluate their investment banking relationships).  
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) document a sharp rise from 18.2% in 1996 to 44% in 2000 in the 
frequency of banks having equity stakes in firms whose IPOs they underwrite. We measure whether this 
means of cementing a banking relationship was part of a broader trend by merging our sample of issuers 
with the Spectrum 13f data on equity stakes held by financial institutions. For each deal, we check 
whether any sample bank active at that time reported an equity holding in the issuer or its corporate 
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parent as of the quarter-end prior to the deal.14 Table III indicates a generally high frequency of 
equity stakes among banks winning underwriting mandates. The exception involves equity transactions 
prior to which the bank did not provide research coverage. This segment of the sample is dominated by 
commercial banks that for most of the period were prevented by regulation from holding equity stakes in 
their clients. 
The high degree of mobility among investment bankers creates potential for relationship shocks not 
captured by transaction-based measures of prior relationships. In general, both theory and casual evidence 
suggest that client relationships are embodied, perhaps in large part, in individual bankers. Thus their 
moves should influence the probability of receiving a mandate faced by both the firm they join and the 
one from which they defected.15 We control for this effect by tracking the movement of key bankers or 
teams of bankers during each quarter in the estimation period.16 We searched electronically through the 
major business periodicals covered by Lexis/Nexis and Proquest to identify individuals or teams who 
most likely played key roles in developing and maintaining client relationships. The bulk of the sample 
came from Investment Dealers’ Digest, which provides weekly reports of the movements of high profile 
bankers. In general, we focused on movements by bankers at the rank of managing director (or its 
equivalent) and above, except in cases where a less senior banker is part of a team or small group of 
bankers switching firms. We classified key bankers as equity or debt specialists. The latter classification 
is more precise in the sense that debt specialists were more typically identified clearly as such. In general, 
M&A professionals were classified as equity specialists. We excluded cases involving prominent traders, 
foreign exchange, mortgage-backed securities and derivatives professionals as well as senior bankers 
primarily involved in management functions. We also excluded professionals whose primary 
                                                           
14 The Spectrum 13f data of institutional holdings are filed with the SEC on a quarterly basis. We match the names of filers to 
our sample banks using where necessary Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers. We thank Edie Hotchkiss for help in 
performing the match. 
15 See Anand and Galetovic (2000) for a discussion of competition among investment banks when client relationships are 
embodied in key employees and therefore non-excludable. Eccles and Crane (1988) provide numerous examples from their 
survey of bankers and their clients supporting this claim. 
16 See Clarke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2002) and Clarke et al. (2003) for related analysis regarding the movement of analysts. 
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responsibilities fell outside North America. This search yielded a sample of 169 records.17  
In many instances, reported defections probably understate the potential damage to client 
relationships. Most bank acquisitions were followed by a substantial degree of movement although not 
necessarily at the most senior level where completion of the deal may have depended on bankers signing 
commitments that would prevent them from joining competitors for a fixed period. To avoid not detecting 
what may be a substantial reordering of banking relationships, we code whether the bank was involved in 
a merger during the quarter before the sample deal took place.  
F. Bank Reputation 
We use prior-year market share to proxy for a bank’s reputation for success in securities underwriting 
(Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Among the summary statistics provided for this variable (separately for 
debt and equity) in Table III, two patterns stand out. First, banks that win underwriting mandates are more 
reputable as evidenced by their higher market shares. Second, this is true whether or not the bank provides 
research coverage. The differences are particularly large for debt transactions.  
G. Analyst Behavior 
We measure analyst behavior using data from the I/B/E/S ‘recommendations’ database. I/B/E/S tracks 
analyst recommendations from late October 1993, covering roughly 10,000 firms, 8,000 analysts, and 500 
banks. Sample firms are matched to I/B/E/S using the corporate parent’s CUSIP if possible and the 
issuing firm’s CUSIP otherwise. Using this algorithm, 3,511 of the 6,821 sample companies and 2,598 of 
the 5,472 unique corporate families match firms covered in I/B/E/S. Some of these matches do not 
correspond with analyst coverage provided by a sample bank. Among the 16,625 sample deals, 10,796 
involve issuers covered by at least one sample bank prior to the deal. Issuers that do not appear in I/B/E/S 
around their deal dates are treated as not receiving coverage from a sample bank.  
                                                           
17 Some records involve a defection from one sample bank to another, so the number of independent records is much smaller. 
As one might expect, banker defections cluster for two reasons: an acquisition or a high level of market activity in the banker’s 
area of specialization. When several key bankers defect in close proximity to one another, existing relationships are more likely 
to suffer. When bankers actually move as teams to a competitor, it is more likely that an existing relationship survived and 
moved with them. When it was stated explicitly that bankers moved as a team, we coded their movement separately as a team 
movement. Our estimation results are robust to focusing only on team movements. 
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Table IV provides descriptive statistics for the deals and issuing firms, according to whether or 
not they received coverage. As one might expect, for both equity and debt deals, firms receiving research 
coverage from sample banks were significantly larger (as measured by deal size), more frequent and 
substantial issuers of securities (as evidenced by their deal histories), more mature (as measured by the 
time from their IPO), and more frequently listed. Firms are also more likely to receive research coverage 
when the bank’s analysts already provided broad coverage for the issuer’s industry, measured as the 
fraction of firms in the issuer’s Fama-French (1997) industry grouping the bank covered at the time.  
I/B/E/S codes recommendations from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell).18 We reverse the ordering so that larger 
numbers indicate more positive recommendations. New, reiterated, or changed recommendations arrive, 
and are recorded by I/B/E/S, irregularly rather than on a monthly or quarterly basis. Thus, the most recent 
recommendation for a given firm by a given bank will not necessarily correspond in time with the most 
recent recommendation from a competing bank. We resolve the time-matching problem by requiring that 
the most recent estimate for firm i be no earlier than 730 days prior to its transaction date. This window 
balances concerns that recommendations by competing banks are relatively close in time with concerns 
that a narrow window potentially eliminates relevant forecasts.19 On average, recommendations 
associated with a particular securities offering were recorded 270 days before the transaction date, with a 
median of 229 days and a standard deviation of 201 days.  
We construct two proxies for analyst behavior. The first measures bank j’s recommendation level 
relative to consensus which we take to be the median recommendation of all other banks covering firm i 
in the 730-day window before i’s deal.20 By construction, relative recommendations lie between –4 and + 
4. Positive values correspond to relatively optimistic recommendations.  
Recent allegations (such as those arising from the Congressional investigation of Salomon Smith 
                                                           
18 Strong buys account for 25% of recommendations, 36% are buy recommendations, 37% are hold recommendations, 1.4% 
are under-perform recommendations and 0.6% are sell recommendations. 
19 All results are robust to Lin and McNichols’ (1998) selection criterion that the most recent recommendation be no earlier 
than one year prior to the offer date.  
20 We subtract the consensus because Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2003) document that the analyst consensus moves up 
ahead of issuance and down ahead of stock repurchases.  
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Barney’s pursuit of AT&T Wireless’s IPO in 2000) center not on the level of recommendations but 
on analysts aggressively upgrading their recommendations prior to the award of an underwriting mandate. 
We examine these allegations by constructing a second measure focusing on relative recommendation 
upgrades. For each bank we calculate the change between the two most recent recommendations. We 
require the latest recommendation to be within 275 days (nine months) of the deal date and the last-but-
one recommendation to be no older than 2 years. If the analyst does not issue a new recommendation in 
the 275 days before the deal, we assume the prior recommendation still stands, implying a zero upgrade. 
If the analyst’s first recommendation occurs in the 275 days prior to the deal (i.e. initiation of coverage), 
we assume that the bank previously was neutral toward the issuer (recommendation level 3) and measure 
the difference between the recommendation at coverage initiation and the assumed neutral prior 
recommendation.21 The relative upgrade is then defined as a bank’s recommendation change for firm i 
less the median change for other banks. Relative upgrades lie between –8 and +8, with positive values 
representing relatively aggressive upgrades.22 
The relative upgrade measure has two potential shortcomings. Not surprisingly, it is zero for the 
majority of firms and so exhibits less variance than do relative recommendations. Moreover, a bank can 
provide a relative upgrade but still be relatively less optimistic than another bank identified as providing 
no upgrade. For example, Goldman’s analyst might have rated IBM as a ‘5’ (strong buy) and not altered 
her opinion before the deal date, while Bear Stearns’ analyst might have upgraded IBM from ‘2’ to ‘3’. 
Bear Stearns would be considered to have upgraded the stock more aggressively than Goldman, even 
though Goldman’s analyst had a higher recommendation level which could not be increased further. To 
account for this, our model for relative upgrades will include a dummy equaling one if the last-but-one 
                                                           
21 Our results are robust to excluding banks with fewer than two recommendations or, in cases where coverage is being 
initiated, using the median rating among competitors rather than a ‘hold’ rating as the basis for relative comparison.  
22 Our results are robust to instead subtracting the mean recommendation or upgrade, defining the peer group to include only 
sample banks (rather than all banks), or defining relative recommendations and upgrades as dummy variables equal to one if 
the sample bank is relatively more aggressive than its peers. 
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recommendation was already a ‘strong buy’, so that a further upgrade would have been impossible.23 
In summary, the relative upgrade measure emphasizes whether the analyst changes her opinion while the 
relative recommendation measure focuses on the (relative) strength or level of the analyst’s opinion.  
Table V shows that by either measure, analysts at winning banks were more aggressive in their 
recommendations, especially prior to debt deals. These results extend the findings of Michaely and 
Womack (1999) and Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) who show that after underwriting an IPO, 
underwriter-affiliated analysts are relatively more optimistic. However, the differences between the 
unconditional means are economically small, and there is no difference between the medians.  
Table V also summarizes three controls for reputation-related career concerns. The first is based on 
buy-side evaluations reflected in the annual Institutional Investor analyst rankings. We match these 
rankings to I/B/E/S records by broker and analyst name. For a deal at time t, we define a dummy to equal 
1 if bank j’s analyst covering the stock was an ‘all-star’ (i.e. ranked as a top-three or runner-up analyst in 
her industry) just prior to making the recommendation. Among equity (debt) deals, 33.4% (41.9%) of 
winning banks have an all-star analyst covering the issuer versus only 27% (35.1%) for losing banks. 
Second, assuming analyst reputation derives, at least in part, from forecasting ability, we measure 
forecast accuracy as in Hong and Kubik (2003). We compute the absolute forecast error of each analyst a 
covering firm i in year t as the difference between the analyst’s most recent forecast of year-end earnings 
per share (issued between January 1 and July 1 of that year) and subsequent realized earnings, scaled by 
price (measured as of the prior December). Sorting absolute forecast errors by size, the ‘best’ (most 
accurate) analyst is assigned a rank of 1, the second best a rank of 2, and so forth. To address possible 
biases due to variation across firms in the number Ni,t of analysts, ranks are then scaled as follows: 
Scorea,i,t = 100
1
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23 This does not drive our results (see footnote 25 below). Alternatively, it is straightforward to show that a composite measure 
that adds relative recommendations to relative upgrades serves to control for the starting level of recommendations. In our 
example, this composite measure would identify Goldman’s analyst as more aggressive than Bear Stearns’. Using this 
composite measure, we find qualitatively identical results (available on request). 
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Thus the most accurate analyst scores 100 and the least accurate zero. We reduce noise by defining 
an analyst’s relative forecast accuracy as her average score in years t-2 to t. Table V reveals relative 
forecast accuracy to average around 50, with a distribution similar to that reported by Hong and Kubik.  
Finally, we measure the analyst’s seniority as the number of years since she first appeared in the 
I/B/E/S database. Hong et al. (2000) find that analysts are less bold early in their careers. For both equity 
and debt deals, analysts at winning banks in our sample are significantly more senior on average, though 
only by a few months.  
III. Estimation Results  
Estimation results are reported in three steps. Section III.A provides a summary of the results from 
estimating the switching criterion given in equation (6). Whether bank j covers an issuing firm i’s stock at 
time t determines whether we observe system (4) or system (5). In the presence of coverage, we use a 
two-step procedure to estimate system (4). The first step estimates the determinants of analyst behavior 
adjusted for truncation due to non-coverage. These are reported in Section III.B for each measure of 
analyst behavior described in the preceding section. In the second step, we model the probability of 
winning the underwriting mandate as a function of the fitted values of analyst behavior obtained in step 1, 
again adjusted for truncation. In the absence of coverage, analyst behavior is unobserved and we estimate 
system (5) as a single-equation model with truncation. The results for these underwriting mandate 
probability models are reported in Section III.C.  
A. The Bank Coverage Model 
Table VI reports results of ‘stand-alone’ probit models of the likelihood that an analyst working for 
bank j covers issuer i’s stock ahead of a deal at time t (equation (6)), estimated separately for equity and 
debt transactions.24 We relate the coverage decision to the strength of the bank’s relationship with the 
                                                           
24 By ‘stand-alone’ we mean that the coefficients are not those obtained from joint maximum likelihood estimations of one of 
the systems that includes the coverage equation. With two measures of analyst behavior and two selectivity-adjusted equations, 
we estimate four sets of coverage parameters for each of the debt and equity samples. There are slight differences among these 
parameter estimates and between these and the stand-alone probit estimates. None of our conclusions are sensitive to this 
reporting convention.  
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issuer, the bank’s market share, the breadth of the bank’s coverage of the issuer’s Fama-French 
industry, and various characteristics of the issuer that might attract coverage. Each of these explanatory 
variables is interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 for commercial banks, to allow for differences in 
the coverage decision criteria between commercial and investment banks.  
The explanatory power for both the equity and debt models is substantial as evidenced by the pseudo-
R2 exceeding 33% in each case. Consistent with the univariate results shown in Tables III and IV, we find 
that a firm’s stock is more likely to be covered prior to a capital market transaction, the stronger the 
relationships between bank and issuer, the larger the bank (in terms of market share), when the bank’s 
analyst already covers a large fraction of the issuer’s sector, the larger the issuer’s fee-generating capacity 
(measured by the log of the size of the current deal and the log of the issuer’s equity or debt proceeds 
raised during the previous five years), the more mature the firm (measured in log years since its initial 
public offering of equity), among U.S. firms, and for exchange-listed firms. In general, the magnitude of 
these effects is smaller for commercial banks, which, all else equal, were less likely to provide coverage.  
In sum, the research coverage models reveal the coverage decision to be heavily influenced by 
variables associated with the strength of a bank’s relationship with the issuing firm and the issuing firm’s 
capacity for sustaining such relationships via fee-generating transactions. Commercial banks were 
latecomers to the provision of research by virtue of Glass-Steagall restrictions on their participation in 
securities markets. Where they did provide coverage, the evidence suggests it was more closely linked 
with a past underwriting relationship than for the investment banks that traditionally provided broader 
coverage as a complement to their brokerage activities.  
B. The Analyst Behavior Models 
Table VII presents estimation results for the analyst behavior model (2) in structural form, for each of 
the two proxies for analyst behavior. The models are estimated separately for debt and equity deals, and 
conditioned on the coverage decision using joint MLE. The relative upgrade specifications include a 
dummy variable equaling one if the last-but-one recommendation was already a strong buy, ruling out 
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a further upgrade (the coefficients, which are negative as expected and strongly significant, are not 
reported).25 
Consistent with prior evidence regarding IPO underwriters, analysts are relatively more aggressive 
when their bank has a strong relationship with the issuer. Specifically, relative recommendations are more 
aggressive, the greater the bank’s shares of the issuer’s past debt and equity proceeds or commercial 
loans, and among banks with equity stakes in the issuing firm. The effects are present in both equity and 
debt transactions and generally are highly statistically significant (see columns 1 and 3).26  
The relative upgrade proxy reflects recent changes in analyst recommendations. As such, it more 
nearly captures the idea that banks pressured analysts to position their recommendations to help the bank 
compete for a specific deal. If banks less closely aligned with the issuer compete for deal flow with more 
aggressive upgrades, we should observe an attenuation of the positive relation between analyst behavior 
and the bank-issuer relationship proxies observed in the relative recommendation model. This appears to 
be the case. For the debt deals shown in column 4, the coefficients associated with the bank’s debt 
underwriting and lending relationships are significantly smaller than in the relative recommendations 
specification. For the equity deals in column 2, the debt-underwriting and lending relationship variables 
cease to be significant at conventional levels, while the coefficient for equity-underwriting relationships 
turns significantly negative: underwriters with strong equity ties upgrade their recommendations less 
aggressively ahead of their clients’ equity deals. Perhaps they don’t need to, as their recommendations are 
already relatively more aggressive.  
A strong reputation in the equity market provides a countervailing force to aggressive behavior: banks 
                                                           
25 As a robustness check, we have repeated our analysis on a sub-sample that drops all cases where the last-but-one 
recommendation was a strong buy, so that the relative upgrade specification no longer requires inclusion of the dummy. All 
results are qualitatively unaffected. 
26 Banks generally are thought to act as intermediaries in securities offerings balancing the competing interests of issuers and 
institutional investors. One might expect banks to favor one side or the other locally as they compete for new business 
opportunities but not globally in equilibrium. Thus the apparent tendency for banks to issue more aggressive recommendations 
for firms with which they already have strong relationships begs for further consideration. If institutional investors do not take 
such behavior particularly seriously or any negative consequences can be offset by other means, then perhaps this is a relatively 
low-cost form of non-price competition of the sort envisioned by Anand and Galetovic (2002). Alternatively, it might reflect 
banks colluding with issuers against investors during our estimation period. Distinguishing between these and other potential 
explanations requires additional modeling to incorporate the relationship between banks and institutional investors. 
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with large equity market shares are associated with significantly less aggressive analyst behavior 
ahead of both equity and debt deals. In contrast, large debt-market and loan-market shares are associated 
with more aggressive behavior, especially for the debt sample.  
In reconciling these apparently conflicting effects, it is useful to recall that equity transactions likely 
suffer more under the burden of informational frictions and so the intermediary’s reputation has a more 
prominent role in certifying issuer quality. One should therefore expect that banks with strong reputations 
in the equity markets would be less inclined to liquidate reputation capital via overly aggressive behavior. 
On the other hand, during the estimation period, commercial banks gained substantial market share in the 
debt markets (in part entering via the corporate loan market) where an intermediary’s reputation poses a 
weaker barrier to entry. Their gains came largely at the expense of lower-ranked investment banks. Other 
things equal, less reputable banks (both commercial and investment) faced weaker countervailing forces 
to their incentive to compete for debt mandates via more aggressive analyst behavior.  
Relative upgrades are less aggressive among all-star analysts suggesting that career concerns moderate 
analysts’ incentives to bend to investment bankers’ demands. The moderating effect of all-star status is 
reversed during the 1999-2000 period usually associated with the ‘dot-com bubble’ during which the 
potential rewards for sacrificing one’s individual reputation might have been greater. As a proxy for the 
size of the potential rewards, we calculate the percentage difference in market-wide proceeds raised 
during the current quarter and a five-year quarterly moving average, and interact it with the bank’s overall 
market share.27 As market-wide issuance activity increased relative to trend, analysts behaved more 
aggressively when their bank was more likely to capture a large share, and this effect is generally 
statistically significant. Similarly, large deals and more active issuers attract more aggressive upgrades, 
consistent with analysts being pressured more when more potential fee income is at stake.  
Finally, more accurate forecasting ability and greater analyst seniority are associated with more 
aggressive behavior in each debt specification, with much weaker evidence in the equity specifications. 
                                                           
27 Our results are robust to using shorter windows and to defining the variable separately for equity and debt deals. 
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This is consistent with the debt markets being the point of entry for commercial banks and non 
bulge-bracket investment banks responding to competitive pressure in this market segment by liquidating 
reputation capital. 
Heckman’s λ is an estimate of the effect of the probability of non-coverage on analyst behavior. The 
positive λ’s reported in Table VII suggest that analysts behave more aggressively ahead of deals by 
issuers whose stock they are unlikely to cover (according to the coverage model). Conversely, companies 
that are more likely to be covered anyway receive less aggressive recommendations and upgrades.  
Instrument Validity 
To ensure that our models are identified, the first-step (analyst behavior) equations include a set of 
five instruments that are excluded from the second-step (lead bank) probits, namely relative forecast 
accuracy, the change in issue activity and its interaction with the bank’s market share, deal size, and the 
issuer’s cumulative proceeds over the prior five years. Economically, these are reasonable instruments: 
the analyst’s tradeoff between the costs and benefits of risking her reputation reasonably affects the 
observed degree of relative aggressiveness without directly bearing on an issuing company’s choice of 
underwriter. Moreover, a given issuer’s deal size and five-year deal history do not vary across banks and 
so do not determine the issuer’s underwriter choice.  
Econometrically, we verify that these are valid instruments in the sense that one or more of them 
correlate with analyst behavior but not with the second-step dependent variable. This is true for three of 
the four analyst behavior models, with F-test statistics well in excess of 10, the critical value for ‘strong’ 
instruments advocated by Staiger and Stock (1997). The exception is the relative recommendation 
specification in the equity sample. There, four of the potential instruments are uncorrelated with the 
second-step dependent variable as required, but their partial correlation with analyst behavior in the 
reduced-form model, though significant, is low (F=3.59), making them ‘weak’ instruments in the sense of 
Staiger and Stock. This has two consequences: the two-step estimator in the equity sample will likely not 
improve on a one-step estimator that treats relative recommendations as exogenous; and the second-
  
25
 
step standard errors for this specification will be imprecise because the Murphy-Topel correction is 
partly based on the first-step covariance matrix. 
C. The Determinants of the Probability of Winning an Underwriting Mandate 
Having estimated the bank coverage and analyst behavior equations, we now condition the probability 
of a bank winning an underwriting mandate on its potentially strategic decision regarding whether to 
cover the issuing firm and if so, on the relative optimism of its analyst’s recommendation.  
Equity Transactions 
Table VIII summarizes the results from estimating the underwriting mandate model for equity 
transactions. Conditional on a bank providing research coverage, there are two specifications in the table, 
one for each measure of analyst behavior. These correspond to system (4) in Section I. In addition, we 
estimate the likelihood of winning a deal in the absence of coverage (i.e. system (5)).  
The first striking result is that among equity deals, relative upgrades reduce a bank’s chances of 
winning an underwriting mandate (p<0.001). This finding runs counter to the spirit of previous research 
and the arguments embodied in recent allegations.28 Interpreting aggressive upgrades as liquidation of 
reputation capital, this strategy appears particularly ineffective in the case of equity offerings where 
reputation is viewed as more central to successful placement. Banks pressed to compete on this dimension 
fought a losing battle.  
The coefficient estimated for the relative recommendation measure, though not significant, also is not 
positive. Recall however that our instruments for this specification are weak, which at minimum biases 
the Murphy-Topel standard errors upwards and possibly causes the two-step estimator to fail to improve 
on a simple one-step estimator treating relative recommendations as exogenous. In other words, in the 
absence of better instruments, it is unclear what effect aggressive recommendations have on a bank’s 
likelihood of winning an equity mandate.  
                                                           
28 It also illustrates the importance of accounting for sample truncation and the endogeneity of analyst behavior arising from 
their career concerns. Had we treated analyst behavior as exogenous, the sign on the coefficient for relative upgrades would 
have flipped to become positive (p<0.001). However, a formal Smith-Blundell (1986) test rejects the null hypothesis that 
analyst behavior is exogenous with respect to the lead bank choice in our data (p<0.0001). 
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If aggressive analyst behavior does not attract equity mandates, what does? The strength of the 
bank-issuer relationship (measured as the bank’s shares of the issuer’s prior equity or debt issuance and 
borrowing or when the bank owns an equity stake in the issuer) strongly increases the likelihood of the 
bank winning the issuer’s current underwriting mandate. Judging from the magnitude of the coefficients,29 
relationships derived from prior equity deals influence the choice of equity underwriter more than those 
based on prior debt deals. The fact that lending relationships help win equity mandates is consistent with 
allegations that commercial banks attempted to tie lending capacity to securities underwriting.30 Prior 
equity underwriting relationships are significantly more important when the bank did not provide 
coverage for the issuer during the event window preceding its equity offering. This is consistent with 
issuing firms valuing research coverage but making tradeoffs at the margin between coverage and the 
strength of their relationships with banks competing for their mandate.  
Banks involved in mergers during the quarter preceding an issuer’s transaction were more likely to 
win mandates, suggesting that at least some of the target bank’s relationships transferred to the acquirer. 
This effect is concentrated among firms not receiving coverage, where issuers might expect the merger to 
result in broader research coverage (including the issuer). Movements of key bankers, on the other hand, 
have little effect on the likelihood of winning an equity mandate, except in the absence of coverage where 
hiring bankers increased and losing bankers decreased the chances of winning an equity mandate.  
The coefficients associated with analyst reputation provide further evidence that issuers value research 
capability in equity offerings. Having an all-star analyst or an analyst of greater seniority provide research 
coverage for the issuing firm significantly increases a bank’s likelihood of winning the mandate.  
The coefficients for the bank’s market share in the prior year suggest that a strong reputation in the 
equity market at large increases the likelihood of winning a mandate regardless of whether the bank 
provides coverage for the issuing firm. By contrast, a strong position in the debt markets has no bearing 
                                                           
29 This being a probit with sample selection correction, the error variance has been normalized to one, so we cannot measure 
the economic magnitudes corresponding to the estimated coefficients. We can, however, make statements about the relative 
size of the coefficients. 
30 Drucker and Puri (2003) find that discounting loans increases the likelihood of winning SEO underwriting mandates. 
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on competition for equity deals. We interpret this as evidence of a degree of bank specialization in 
either debt or equity. Large lenders – effectively, commercial banks – were significantly less likely to win 
equity mandates, especially when they did not provide research coverage. Thus while having a lending 
relationship helps, just being a large lender does not. 
Debt Transactions 
Table IX reveals that more aggressive stock recommendations significantly decreased the likelihood 
of winning debt-underwriting mandates (p=0.008). In terms of the raw data, this implies that banks 
frequently won debt-underwriting mandates despite their analysts having issued a below-consensus 
recommendation for the issuer’s stock. This is borne out in the underlying data. Among winners of debt 
underwriting mandates, only 32.8% of recommendations were ‘strong buys’. In other words, 67.2% of the 
time, the winning banks’ analysts were not necessarily the most aggressive, issuing ‘buy’ (42.4%), ‘hold’ 
(24.3%) or even ‘under-perform’ and ‘sell’ recommendations (0.4%).  While having a relatively 
aggressive recommendation thus doesn’t necessarily help a bank’s chances of winning a debt mandate, 
the essentially zero coefficient estimated for relative upgrades suggests that it doesn’t matter if the analyst 
has been bullish for a long time or only recently upgraded the stock.  
As with equity deals, prior relationships strongly influence issuers’ choices of debt underwriters. This 
is true for both prior debt and equity deals, though relationships derived from having underwritten an 
issuer’s prior debt offerings are most effective. This is consistent with specialization and mirrors the 
results for the equity sample. Lending relationships too help win debt mandates.  
In contrast to the equity results, owning an equity stake in the issuing firm had little effect on the 
likelihood of winning debt mandates when the bank provided coverage, and a negative effect when it did 
not. Commercial banks and non-bulge-bracket investment banks accounted for the bulk of the cases 
where no research coverage was provided. Commercial banks were prohibited from holding equity stakes 
during the first half of the estimation period. Moreover, commercial banks gained substantial debt-market 
share largely at the expense of non-bulge-bracket investment banks (at least through 1998). Thus we 
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favor the interpretation that in the absence of coverage, lending relationships dominated any positive 
relationship effects associated with equity ownership. As a consequence, we observe a negative relation 
between bank equity stakes (mostly held by investment banks) and the likelihood of winning a debt 
mandate in the absence of coverage. Regardless of this interpretation, commercial banks appear to have 
gained leverage in the debt markets via their lending capacity.  
Mergers have a positive effect on winning debt mandates, though this is significant only in the 
upgrade specification. Movements of key bankers, on the other hand, which often coincided with mergers, 
have a more consistent effect: a bank’s chances of winning a mandate were lower when it recently had 
lost key members of its debt team and higher when it had poached debt professionals from other banks. 
This finding suggests that relationships are embodied in key people. 
Interestingly, having an all-star analyst covering the issuer’s stock had a negative effect on whether 
the analyst’s bank was awarded the debt-underwriting mandate. This is consistent with commercial banks 
– which employ fewer all-stars – successfully competing for debt deals. All else equal, however, issuers 
were more likely to choose banks with more senior analysts. 
The coefficients associated with a bank’s debt and equity market share during the calendar year 
preceding a transaction provide further evidence of bank specialization. Banks with larger debt market 
shares were more likely to win subsequent debt mandates, similar to the direct effect of equity market 
share on the likelihood of winning subsequent equity mandates. By contrast, banks with larger equity 
market shares were less likely to win debt-underwriting mandates, other things equal. 
We also find that a larger share of the corporate loan market increased a bank’s probability of winning 
debt-underwriting mandates. This result is consistent with the argument that competitive pressure from 
the ‘pay-to-play’ movement initiated by commercial banks had its greatest impact in the debt markets. 
Both the analyst behavior coefficients and the large gains in debt-market share among commercial banks 
even in the early part of the 1990s suggest that liquidation of reputation capital was not an effective 
competitive response, at least not across the entire estimation period. In the next section, we examine 
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whether the effectiveness of this competitive strategy changed over time.  
Differences Across Time 
Panel A of Table X reports coefficients for the instrument for analyst behavior during the 1993-1997 
and 1998-June 2002 sub-periods. The rationale for partitioning the estimation period is that the end of the 
first sub-period corresponds roughly with the de facto repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act revealed by the 
approval of Citicorp’s acquisition of Salomon Smith Barney in 1998 and the beginning of the ‘dot-com 
bubble’ with which allegations of analyst misbehavior primarily are associated. We estimate the full 
model discussed previously but to conserve space, we suppress all but the analyst-behavior coefficients. 
The remainder of the model is quite stable across the sub-periods and so we simply highlight instances in 
which partitioning the data leads to qualitative changes in our interpretation of the results.  
For the equity sample, we find no evidence that analyst behavior positively influenced the likelihood 
of winning equity-underwriting mandates, even after 1997. On the contrary: post-1997 banks whose 
analysts upgraded issuers’ stocks more aggressively were significantly less likely to win mandates 
(p=0.014). To gain further insight, we interact the analyst behavior instruments with a dummy equaling 
one for deals completed during the bubble years (1999 and 2000), but find no evidence that analyst 
behavior had a differential effect on issuers’ choices during that period (not shown in the table). 
The main changes over time for the equity sample concern the increasing importance of a highly rated 
analyst and the (relatively) decreasing importance of prior lending relationships (which go from being 
three times more effective than debt relationships and nearly as effective as equity relationships to being 
the least important source of a bank’s relationship benefits).  
The picture is quite different for debt deals. The relative recommendation specification reveals that the 
significant negative effect on the likelihood of winning a debt-underwriting mandate is concentrated in the 
pre-1997 period (p=0.037), precisely when commercial banks began to enter debt underwriting. The 
negative sign of the effect is consistent with incumbent (investment) banks reacting, unsuccessfully, to 
commercial bank entry by liquidating reputation capital. After 1997, the effect remains negative but is 
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no longer significant at conventional levels (p=0.085).  
There are three additional significant differences across the two time periods. In contrast to the equity 
model, the presence of an all-star analyst – typically employed at an investment bank – reduced the 
likelihood of winning debt mandates during the post-1997 period. Second, large lenders were significantly 
less likely to win debt mandates pre-1997 but more likely in the post-1997 period. Both of these results 
are indicative of the successful inroads commercial banks made into the debt markets. Third, holding an 
equity stake in the issuer helped the bank win the mandate only in the pre-1998 period. A natural 
interpretation of this finding is that by 1998, the easing of restrictions on holding equity stakes helped 
level the playing field between investment banks and commercial banks. 
Controlling for the Exclusivity of Relationships 
Although relationship exclusivity declined during the sample period, one might conjecture that the 
majority of issuers continued to maintain relatively exclusive relationships. We explore whether this 
possibility influenced our findings by interacting the analyst behavior proxies with two measures of the 
likelihood that a mandate truly is ‘up for grabs’.31  
The first measure is a dummy for firms maintaining relatively weak underwriting relationships. For 
each of the 5,908 equity deals and 10,717 debt deals in the sample, the dummy variable equals 1 if during 
the prior five years no bank competing for the deal underwrote 25% or more of the issuer’s prior equity or 
debt offerings, respectively. In other words, the issuer maintained relationships with at least five banks. 
This measure classifies 59.2% of equity issuers and 31.8% of debt issuers as not maintaining exclusive 
relationships. The second measure attempts to capture a firm’s ‘switching propensity’ by estimating 
probits (separately in the equity and debt samples) for generating the predicted likelihood that a firm will 
hire a different bank than the one it used in its previous deal. The probits are conditioned on the firm’s 
maturity (log years since IPO), the dummy for firms maintaining relatively weak relationships, the log 
size of the current deal, and (for debt deals) a dummy for high-yield bond offers. Firms are more likely to 
                                                           
31 We thank Francesca Cornelli and Raghu Rajan for suggesting this analysis. 
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switch, the more mature they are and if they have weaker relationships. Equity issuers are more 
likely to switch the larger the current deal, while the reverse is true for debt issuers. Issuers of high-yield 
bonds are more likely to switch underwriters.  
The results using these interactions for the strength of the underwriting relationship are reported in 
Panels B and C of Table X, respectively. As in the sub-period analysis, we report only the coefficients of 
interest. In Panel B, more aggressive analyst behavior generally is associated with a significantly lower 
likelihood of the bank winning the mandate when the issuer maintains relatively weak relationships. 
Relatively aggressive recommendations ahead of equity deals and aggressive upgrades ahead of debt 
deals, neither of which were significant in the sample as a whole, have a significantly detrimental effect 
on a bank’s chances of winning a mandate when the issuer maintains weak relationships. The only 
exception involves aggressive upgrades ahead of equity deals where the negative effect on a bank’s 
chances of winning the mandate are virtually neutralized in the presence of a weak relationship.  
Exactly the same results obtain when we interact the analyst behavior variables with our measure of 
switching propensity. The more prone an issuer is to switch underwriters, the less the bank benefits from 
aggressive analyst behavior. The exception again is aggressive upgrades ahead of equity deals, which 
neutralize the otherwise harmful effect of such behavior. 
These results suggest that competing for mandates that were more likely to be up for grabs by 
aggressively liquidating reputation capital was counter-productive. Presumably it was the more desperate 
banks that resorted to such tactics. 
IV. Conclusion 
We examine 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002 for 
evidence that sell-side analyst behavior influenced the issuer’s choice of bank to underwrite its offering. 
This is precisely the motivation suggested by recent allegations that analysts misrepresented their beliefs 
about potential issuers under pressure from investment bankers competing for underwriting mandates. 
Our findings provide little support for this argument but perhaps more importantly they draw 
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attention to the complexity of the situation and some unique features of the sample period.32 
In the equity markets, we find little evidence that banks gained competitive advantage via aggressive 
recommendation behavior among their analysts. In general, the state of bank-issuer relationships and the 
reputation of both the bank and the analyst had far more influence over the outcome of competition for 
equity mandates. Prior equity underwriting relationships are significantly more important when the bank 
did not provide coverage for the issuer during the event window preceding its equity offering.  
Recent allegations related to aggressive analyst behavior have arisen primarily in the context of the 
equity markets. Seen in this light, our findings may strike some readers as surprising if not implausible. 
However, there is a straightforward economic argument consistent with the negative relation between 
aggressive analyst behavior and the likelihood of winning equity mandates. Equity transactions are 
subject to significant information frictions that are best resolved by a credible intermediary. If overly 
aggressive recommendations undermine credibility, they will compromise a bank’s capacity for resolving 
information frictions. Theory suggests that the information frictions that make credibility so important for 
equity underwriting are less severe in debt offerings. We find evidence that reputation concerns carried 
less force for tempering aggressive behavior among analysts prior to debt offerings.  
Both banks and individual analysts have incentive to build and preserve reputations for accuracy and 
honesty in their research. We find evidence of this moderating force at work in the data. This should not 
be surprising given the industry’s heavy dependence on reputation for carrying out underwriting functions 
and the longstanding nature of the conflict of interest between investment banking and sell-side research. 
In light of calls for heavier regulation or even separation of research from investment banking, one might 
                                                           
32 Relative to existing research, our research design de-emphasizes the initial public offering by examining all capital market 
transactions by an issuer during the sample period. From a theoretical perspective we contend that an issuer’s transactions with 
a bank should not be treated as independent events. Our evidence is consistent with this argument. From a practical 
perspective, relatively few firms attract analyst research coverage prior to their IPO and thus most IPOs are classified as no-
coverage cases in our sample. The exception is carve-outs by parents whose stocks are already covered. In this sub-sample, we 
still find that aggressive analyst behavior failed to help banks win business. We note, however, that anecdotal evidence 
suggests that banks and their analysts competed for IPO underwriting mandates by making (non-binding) commitments to 
provide favorable research coverage. Although such behavior is relevant to the question at hand, it is econometrically 
unobservable and thus we cannot determine how it influenced the issuer’s choice of underwriter. The finding by Cliff and 
Denis (2003) that firms are more likely to switch underwriters when they receive less coverage than expected is consistent with 
punishment for violation of such implied contracts.  
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ask whether the fundamentals of securities underwriting have changed. We contend that 
preservation rather than aggressive liquidation of reputation capital will more likely characterize 
equilibrium behavior in the industry for the foreseeable future.  
It does not follow that our findings absolve analysts and their banks from any alleged misconduct. In 
fact, we find some evidence that competition for the massive fee pool available in the late 1990s 
overwhelmed the moderating effect of reputational concerns. But even with an unusually large fee pool at 
stake, banks should not grossly misrepresent their beliefs about issuers unless they expect 
misrepresentations to favorably influence investor behavior. Perhaps not coincidentally, the late 1990s 
(not unlike the 1920s) were unusual for witnessing a temporarily high level of direct securities market 
participation among retail investors. 
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Figure 1. Principal Bank Mergers, 1988-2002. 
The figure presents a time line of the principal merger and acquisition events involving sample banks over the period 1988 to 
June 2002. A vertical line indicates a merger of two banks. A dashed line indicates a sale or split-off of a bank. For 
estimation purposes, the sample includes all banks active as of June 2002 (see the right-hand side legend) as well as their 
predecessor banks. These are the banks considered in competition for a given deal at a given point in time, as long as they 
held Tier II authority to underwrite securities at that time. There is one exception. The two boutique investment banks 
acquired by Prudential Securities, Vector Securities and Volpe Brown Whelan, are not considered in competition for any 
deals due to their specialized nature and small size. Prudential withdrew from underwriting in Q4 2000. Following a merger, 
the new entity ‘inherits’ the relationships of its predecessors. Following a sale or a split-off, the new entities ‘inherit’ the 
relationships previously developed by the joint entity. We consider a bank merged on the first day of the month following the 
completion of the merger. From that day on, it competes in its merged form. Tier II authority involves separate approval for 
debt and equity underwriting. The approval dates (debt, equity) used for the sample commercial banks are as follows: BA 
Securities (10/11/94, 10/11/94), BT Securities (1/1/93, 1/15/91), BankBoston (11/1/96, 11/1/96), CIBC Wood Gundy 
Securities (6/30/90, 1/15/91), Chase Securities (7/26/89, 6/15/94), Chemical Securities (6/30/93, -), Deutsche Bank (12/1/92, 
12/1/92), JP Morgan Securities (1/1/89, 1/1/90), NationsBank (7/26/93, 7/26/93), SBC (1/3/95, -), UBS Securities (debt 
underwriting grand-fathered throughout sample period, equity: 1/1/95), Citicorp (7/26/89, expected to receive equity approval 
as of 3/27/95 but not clear if received prior to merger with Traveler’s). 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Alex Brown & Sons Inc
Bankers Trust (*)
Deutsche (*)
Fleet (*)
Bank of Boston Corp (*) Fleet/Boston Robertson Stephens
Bank of America (*)
Security Pacific (*)
Continental Bank (*)
Robertson Stephens & Co
Montgomery Securities
NationsBank (*)
Thomas Weisel Partners LLC
Bear Stearns & Co Inc Bear Stearns & Co Inc
Manufacturers Hanover Bank (*)
Chemical Bank (*)
Chase Manhattan (*)
Hambrecht & Quist JP Morgan Chase
JP Morgan (*)
CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (*)
Oppenheimer & Co Inc
Citicorp (*)
Salomon Brothers
Smith Barney Inc
Schroders
Cowen
Societe Generale (*)
Credit Suisse First Boston
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc
Morgan Stanley & Co
Union Bank of Switzerland (*)
Swiss Bank Corp (*)
SG Warburg Securities
Dillon, Read & Co Inc UBS Warburg
PaineWebber
Kidder Peabody & Co Inc
Goldman Sachs & Co Goldman Sachs & Co
Lehman Brothers Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc Merrill Lynch & Co Inc
Prudential Securities Inc
Vector Securities
Volpe Brown Whelan
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 (*)  = commercial bank
                        = Tier II Approval (approximate, see above)
SG Cowen Securities Corp
Deutsche Bank Securities
Prudential Volpe
Banc of America Securities LLC
CIBC World Markets Inc
Credit Suisse First Boston
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Salomon Smith Barney
  
Table I. The Sample of Capital Raising Transactions. 
The total sample includes the universe of 36,173 capital raising transactions between January 1, 1988 and June 30, 2002 reported 
by Securities Data Corporation excluding transactions by issuers classified as SIC 6000-6999 (financial institutions etc) and SIC 
9000-9999 (government agencies etc). We use this sample to generate a variety of variables, including prior relationships between 
issuers and banks. Many issuers are related to each other so we form corporate families on the basis of SDCs ultimate parent 
CUSIP identifier. I/B/E/S data is available only from late 1993, so for the estimation of our econometric model we focus on a 
sub-sample of deals carried out between December 1, 1993 and June 30, 2002. We also exclude a) any issuer or family of issuers 
who never hired any of our sample banks for a capital raising transaction between 1988 and June 2002 (sample banks are 
identified in Table II and Figure 1); and b) purely-foreign issuers or families of issuers (though we do include corporate families 
that have at least one U.S. member). The resulting estimation period sub-sample is shown in the final two columns. 
 
 
1988-June 2002 
 Estimation period  
(Dec. 1993-June 2002) 
 
No. of deals 
Amount raised 
($m, nominal)  No. of deals 
Amount raised 
($m, nominal) 
Equity:      
 Common stock 10,945 1,230,040  5,229 745,117 
 Private common 1,981 68,305  679 29,051 
Debt:      
 Non-convertible debt 10,638 1,836,942  6,565 1,155,397 
 Convertible debt 533 111,231  220 72,886 
 Private non-convertible debt 9,510 557,167  2,714 152,233 
 Private convertible debt 280 8,538  102 5,398 
 Non-convertible preferred 555 73,402 
 
217 35,357 
 Convertible preferred 309 68,762  142 49,306 
 Private non-convertible preferred 555 21,414  233 8,626 
 Private convertible preferred 867 36,600  524 26,435 
       
All deals 36,173 4,012,401  16,625 2,279,807 
      
 
 
 
  
Table II. The Bank Sample. 
The table summarizes the market share captured by the 16 sample banks for the 36,173 sample transactions taking place during the 
January 1, 1988 through June 30, 2002 sample period. The bank sample comprises the 16 most-active underwriters judged by 
proceeds raised in both debt and equity offerings during 2000-2002. Market share is determined by assigning to the lead 
underwriter 100% of the nominal amount raised. (When there are co-leaders in a transaction, they share equally for the purposes of 
calculating market share). Many of the 16 banks represent the outcome of one or more mergers or acquisitions during the sample 
period. In such cases, the surviving bank listed below inherits the market share of its predecessors (listed in Figure 1).  
 
 Equity deals Debt deals  All deals 
 
Market 
share (%)
Amount 
raised ($m, 
nominal)
Market 
share (%)
Amount 
raised ($m, 
nominal)
Market 
share (%)
Amount 
raised ($m, 
nominal)
 
Banc of America Securities LLC 3.0 39,386 5.0 135,634 4.4 175,020
Bear Stearns & Co Inc 2.0 26,154 1.6 43,052 1.7 69,207
CIBC World Markets Inc 0.8 10,264 0.3 7,036 0.4 17,299
Credit Suisse First Boston 14.0 181,579 10.9 297,165 11.9 478,744
Deutsche Banc Securities 4.2 54,185 2.2 60,744 2.9 114,930
Fleet Boston (Robertson Stephens) 1.0 13,299 0.1 4,069 0.4 17,368
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.5 227,333 13.7 371,736 14.9 599,069
JP Morgan Chase 4.5 58,730 9.7 264,421 8.1 323,150
Lehman Brothers 5.0 65,413 6.5 175,650 6.0 241,063
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 11.5 148,982 13.5 365,412 12.8 514,394
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter 12.4 161,265 10.8 293,156 11.3 454,421
Prudential Volpe Technology Group 0.8 10,340 0.3 8,918 0.5 19,258
SG Cowen Securities Corp 0.6 8,038 0.1 2,211 0.3 10,248
Salomon Smith Barney  8.7 113,432 14.4 389,678 12.5 503,110
Thomas Weisel Partners LLC 0.2 2,119 0.0 25 0.1 2,144
UBS Warburg 4.7 60,459 3.9 105,557 4.1 166,015
         
All 16 sample banks (and predecessors) 91.0 1,180,977 93.0 2,524,463 92.3 3,705,440
 
 
Table III. Bank-issuer Relationships and Bank Characteristics.
test:
winner
mean st.dev. median mean st.dev. median vs loser
Panel A: Equity - Coverage N=2,080 N=9,821
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals over the prior 5 years 46.3 47.4 30.1 6.4 22.5 0.0 58.1
                                ... debt deals over the prior 5 years 8.4 25.0 0.0 3.0 14.0 0.0 13.6
                                ... loans over the prior 5 years 2.4 11.0 0.0 1.3 7.5 0.0 5.5
bank’s share of loan market, prior calendar year 1.7 3.2 0.4 2.0 3.7 0.4 -3.5
                    ... equity market, prior calendar year 6.4 5.8 4.5 4.9 5.0 3.2 12.1
                    ... debt market, prior calendar year 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.9 5.2 2.2 8.6
fraction with bank stake in issuer's equity 49.8 54.7 -4.0
fraction commercial banks 17.8 23.3 -5.5
Panel B: Equity - No coverage N=4,092 N=127,028
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals over the prior 5 years 7.9 25.7 0.0 0.4 5.6 0.0 66.5
                                ... debt deals over the prior 5 years 4.8 20.2 0.0 0.4 5.5 0.0 43.4
                                ... loans over the prior 5 years 1.3 8.5 0.0 0.6 6.1 0.0 6.8
bank’s share of loan market, prior calendar year 1.5 3.1 0.1 2.1 3.6 0.3 -10.3
                    ... equity market, prior calendar year 5.5 5.8 3.2 3.5 4.8 1.4 25.2
                    ... debt market, prior calendar year 5.3 5.7 2.7 3.7 4.8 1.3 20.7
fraction with bank stake in issuer's equity 17.9 13.2 8.7
fraction commercial banks 17.7 30.2 -17.3
Panel C: Debt - Coverage N=4,427 N=54,358
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals over the prior 5 years 12.9 31.5 0.0 3.0 15.5 0.0 36.7
                                ... debt deals over the prior 5 years 25.9 30.8 14.8 4.8 13.6 0.0 86.6
                                ... loans over the prior 5 years 4.0 12.1 0.0 1.1 5.7 0.0 29.1
bank’s share of loan market, prior calendar year 2.5 4.0 0.6 1.5 2.9 0.3 21.0
                    ... equity market, prior calendar year 8.6 5.8 7.2 5.5 5.4 3.5 36.2
                    ... debt market, prior calendar year 9.6 4.9 10.0 5.4 5.2 3.6 52.0
fraction with bank stake in issuer's equity 65.8 67.3 -2.1
fraction commercial banks 22.8 17.7 8.6
Panel D: Debt - No coverage N=7,432 N=194,057
bank’s share of issuer’s equity deals over the prior 5 years 4.2 19.1 0.0 0.6 6.9 0.0 40.0
                                ... debt deals over the prior 5 years 18.1 31.2 0.0 1.3 8.1 0.0 143.4
                                ... loans over the prior 5 years 7.4 20.2 0.0 1.3 7.4 0.0 63.2
bank’s share of loan market, prior calendar year 4.5 5.5 1.4 2.6 4.0 0.8 39.5
                    ... equity market, prior calendar year 4.8 5.8 2.4 3.1 4.5 1.2 32.7
                    ... debt market, prior calendar year 6.4 5.7 4.5 3.2 4.5 1.2 59.0
fraction with bank stake in issuer's equity 34.1 32.6 2.7
fraction commercial banks 48.4 37.6 18.9
Winning banks Losing banks
The dataset consists of 16,625 deals. The unit of observation is a bank-deal pair. Occasionally, banks co-lead a deal, so there are a total of 18,031 bank-
deal pairs in the column headed "winning banks". The column headed "losing banks" refers to bank-deal pairs involving banks that were eligible to
compete for but did not win a given deal. On average, there were 24.3 banks treated as competing for every deal. For each bank-deal pair, we report
measures of the banks' prior relationships with the issuers, their shares of the equity, debt, and corporate loan markets, the number of "all-star" analyst
teams they had according to the most recent Institutional Investor poll before the deal, the fraction of the issuer's industry covered by their analysts
(aggregated into the 48 Fama-French (1997) industry groups), the extent of bank equity ownership in issuing firms (based on 13f filings as of the quarter-
end preceding the deal), and the fraction of commercial banks in each group. These are broken down by equity and debt, and by whether the bank's analyst
covered the issuers stock in the prior 730 days. The final column shows tests of the null that the means and fractions for winning and losing banks are equal. 
Though not shown, comparing coverage and no-coverage, all means and fractions are significantly different with one exception (the fraction of commercial
banks among banks winning equity deals). All numbers are in percent.
Table IV. Descriptive Statistics: Issuer and Deal Characteristics.
t -test of
difference
in means/
mean st.dev. median mean st.dev. median fractions
Panel A: Equity deals N=2,903 N=3,005
deal size (in $m) 180.1 411.7 84.0 83.6 192.4 44.0 11.6
issuer’s equity proceeds prior 5 years (in $m) 172.1 511.5 51.2 14.8 132.2 0.0 16.3
issuer’s debt proceeds prior 5 years (in $m) 263.2 979.3 0.0 39.9 550.3 0.0 10.9
time since IPO (in years) 9.3 12.6 3.9 2.1 6.7 0.0 26.9
fraction not listed (%) 0.4 8.1 -14.5
fraction U.S. company (%) 98.4 98.9 -1.5
fraction of issuer's Fama-French industry covered by bank (%) 13.9 12.2 1.9
Panel B: Debt deals N=7,893 N=2,824
deal size (in $m) 164.5 265.9 89.5 73.4 114.7 32.0 17.6
issuer’s equity proceeds prior 5 years (in $m) 262.7 827.4 0.0 52.8 346.4 0.0 13.1
issuer’s debt proceeds prior 5 years (in $m) 2,508.0 5,429.8 798.8 259.8 1416.1 0.0 21.7
time since IPO (in years) 28.4 18.1 28.7 16.1 17.5 10.9 20.4
fraction not listed (%) 2.2 71.6 -78.5
fraction U.S. company (%) 98.2 94.2 11.2
fraction of issuer's Fama-French industry covered by bank (%) 15.4 13.0 3.2
Coverage No coverage
The dataset contains 16,625 deals by 6,821 unique companies and 5,472 unique corporate families. 10,796 of the 16,625 deals involve issuers that are covered by at least
one sample bank in I/B/E/S in the 730 days prior to the deal. All currency amounts are in nominal terms. The last column provides t -tests of differences in
means/fractions.
Table V. Recommendations and Analyst Characteristics.
test:
winner
No. obs mean st.dev. median No. obs mean st.dev. median No. obs mean st.dev. median vs. loser
Panel A: Equity deals
relative recommendation 11,901 -0.039 0.704 0.000 2,080 0.113 0.586 0.000 9,821 -0.071 0.722 0.000 10.9
relative upgrade 11,901 0.104 0.784 0.000 2,080 0.131 0.740 0.000 9,821 0.098 0.793 0.000 1.7
fraction of issuers covered by all-star analysts (%) 11,901 28.1 2,080 33.4 9,821 27.0 5.9
relative forecast accuracy 11,017 51.7 10.5 52.3 1,968 51.8 10.7 52.6 9,049 51.7 10.4 52.2 0.6
analyst's seniority (years in I/B/E/S database) 11,468 6.5 4.8 5.5 2,028 6.9 4.8 6.0 9,440 6.4 4.8 5.4 4.0
Panel B: Debt deals
relative recommendation 58,785 0.052 0.794 0.000 4,427 0.199 0.745 0.000 54,358 0.040 0.796 0.000 12.8
relative upgrade 58,785 0.099 0.820 0.000 4,427 0.160 0.809 0.000 54,358 0.094 0.821 0.000 5.2
fraction of issuers covered by all-star analysts (%) 58,785 35.6 4,427 41.9 54,358 35.1 9.0
relative forecast accuracy 55,338 52.2 9.1 52.9 4,145 52.7 8.6 53.0 51,193 52.2 9.1 52.9 3.8
analyst's seniority (years in I/B/E/S database) 57,207 7.2 4.9 6.4 4,274 7.4 4.9 6.8 52,933 7.1 4.9 6.4 3.8
All banks Winning banks Losing banks
We construct two measures of analyst behavior. Relative recommendations measure bank j ’s recommendation level relative to its peer banks by subtracting from bank j ’s most recent recommendation
the median recommendation of all sample banks covering firm i in the 730-day window before i ’s next deal. Relative upgrades are computed as a bank’s recommendation change for firm i less the
median change of other sample banks. By construction, both measures lie between –4 and +4, with positive values denoting relatively aggressive recommendations or upgrades. We report descriptive
statistics for these separately for equity and debt deals, and broken down by whether the bank won or lost the underwriting mandate. All-star analysts are those ranked in the top 4 in their industry in the
most recent Institutional Investor survey preceding the deal. Relative forecast accuracy is a measure of the analyst's forecast accuracy for the issuer's stock, relative to other analysts. It is constructed as
in Hong and Kubik (2003) and ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher number indicating greater forecast accuracy. As a proxy for seniority, we compute the number of years since the analyst first appeared
in the I/B/E/S database. The last column provides t -tests of differences in means/fractions.
  
Table VI. Strategic Coverage Decisions. 
We estimate the determinants of the coverage decision using probit MLE. This corresponds to equation (3). The coverage decision 
determines whether or not we observe the analysts behavior in subsequent tables. Therefore, the estimation results in subsequent 
tables are conditioned on the coverage decision using the Heckman (1979) MLE framework, where the coverage decision and 
analyst behavior are jointly estimated. For the purpose of illustrating what determines coverage, this table shows the results of two 
stand-alone probits, for equity and debt deals respectively. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the banks analyst 
covers the issuers stock at any point during the two years preceding the deal. Since commercial banks in our sample period are 
generally less likely to provide research coverage, we interact all explanatory variables with a dummy equaling one for 
commercial banks. This provides an estimate of the differential effect of each explanatory variable on the likelihood that a 
commercial bank (rather than an investment bank) covers the issuers stock. The dummy for mergers is coded 1 in the quarter of 
the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three quarters. Banks that cover a larger fraction of an issuers industry are more likely to 
cover the issuer as well. We control for this using the fraction of the issuing firms Fama-French (1997) industry that is covered by 
bank j at time t. Intercepts and year effects are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. We use ***, **, and * to denote 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of observations is 143,021 in the equity model 
and 260,274 in the debt model. 
 
 Probit 1: Equity deals  Probit 2: Debt deals 
   
× commercial 
bank dummy    
× commercial 
bank dummy
Bank-issuer relationships        
banks share of issuers debt deals prior 5 years 0.360*** 0.133  0.346*** 0.181** 
 0.058 0.127  0.028 0.065 
banks share of issuers equity deals prior 5 years 1.729*** -0.308***  0.550*** -0.052 
 0.035 0.076  0.028 0.076 
banks share of issuers loans prior 5 years 0.449* -0.058  0.664*** -0.100 
 0.209 0.228  0.161 0.169 
=1 if bank owns equity in issuer 0.531*** -0.092**  0.492*** -0.161*** 
 0.016 0.031  0.008 0.018 
Bank characteristics      
banks equity market share prior calendar year 0.375 6.495***  0.745*** 9.814*** 
 0.248 0.840  0.128 0.476 
banks debt market share prior calendar year -1.622*** -1.471**  0.999*** -1.636*** 
 0.264 0.541  0.140 0.313 
banks loan market share prior calendar year -1.298 2.573*  -1.261* -0.832 
 0.990 1.033  0.544 0.575 
dummy: bank involved in merger  0.162** 0.347***  0.585*** -0.352*** 
 0.053 0.080  0.029 0.046 
fraction of issuers Fama-French industry covered 3.067*** 1.136***  3.694*** 1.153*** 
 0.064 0.132  0.030 0.068 
Issuer characteristics      
log $ deal size  0.209*** -0.045***  0.056*** 0.035*** 
 0.006 0.011  0.003 0.005 
log issuers $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  0.114*** -0.005  0.125*** -0.033*** 
 0.003 0.006  0.002 0.003 
log time since IPO 0.437*** -0.154***  -0.068*** -0.072*** 
 0.011 0.021  0.006 0.011 
=1 if domestic firm 0.341*** 0.102  0.533*** -0.228*** 
 0.048 0.065  0.024 0.036 
=1 if firm is not listed -0.442*** -0.747**  -0.966*** -0.314*** 
 0.073 0.265  0.018 0.047 
Diagnostics      
LR test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 27,464*** 91,941*** 
Pseudo-R2 33.5 % 33.1 % 
  
Table VII. Analyst Behavior. 
The dependent variable is analyst behavior as measured by relative recommendations and relative upgrades. This is observed only 
when the bank covers the stock, so we estimate Heckman (1979) selection models using joint MLE. The results for the associated 
selection equation are illustrated in Table VI. The table reports estimation results in structural form. The reduced forms used to 
generate instruments for the models in Tables VIII and IX include also the exogenous variables from the lead-bank equation and 
are not shown. The relative upgrade models include a dummy equal to one if the previous recommendation was a strong buy; the 
coefficients, which are negative and significant, are not shown. The bubble dummy equals 1 for deals in 1999 and 2000. Analyst 
characteristics (relative forecast accuracy and seniority) are defined as in Table V. To proxy for the size of potential rewards for 
liquidating reputation capital, we calculate the percentage difference in market-wide proceeds raised during the current quarter and 
a five-year quarterly moving average. Results are robust to using shorter windows. Intercepts are not shown. Standard errors are 
shown in italics. We use ***, **, * and  to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The 
number of observations where the bank provides research coverage is 11,006 in the equity model and 55,320 in the debt model. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
Relative recomm. 
(1) 
upgrades 
(2)  
recomm. 
(3)  
upgrades 
(4) 
Bank-issuer relationships      
banks share of issuers debt deals prior 5 years 0.165*** 0.079  0.267*** 0.118*** 
 0.041 0.043  0.022 0.021 
banks share of issuers equity deals prior 5 years 0.125*** -0.063*  0.121*** 0.146*** 
 0.028 0.030  0.020 0.019 
banks share of issuers loans prior 5 years 0.107 0.157  0.616*** 0.312*** 
 0.086 0.090  0.057 0.056 
=1 if bank owns equity in issuer 0.088*** 0.092***  0.089*** 0.073*** 
 0.017 0.018  0.008 0.008 
Bank and analyst characteristics      
banks equity market share prior calendar year -0.955*** -0.482*  -0.500*** -0.205 
 0.232 0.244  0.109 0.106 
banks debt market share prior calendar year 0.983*** 0.445  1.100*** 0.401*** 
 0.242 0.254  0.123 0.121 
banks loan market share prior calendar year 0.067 0.345  1.245*** 1.383*** 
 0.222 0.233  0.141 0.138 
=1 if analyst is ranked all-star by Institutional Investor -0.004 -0.068***  0.009 -0.048*** 
 0.018 0.019  0.008 0.008 
 x bubble dummy 0.020 0.083**  0.007 0.082*** 
 0.029 0.031  0.015 0.014 
change in issue activity relative to 5-yr moving average -0.132*** -0.051  -0.003 0.024 
 0.038 0.040  0.020 0.019 
 x banks market share  1.190* 1.087  0.610* 0.576* 
 0.556 0.584  0.264 0.258 
relative forecast accuracy 0.002** 0.001  0.004*** 0.002*** 
 0.001 0.001  0.0004 0.0004 
log analysts seniority (in years) 0.014 0.003  0.017*** 0.018*** 
 0.010 0.010  0.005 0.005 
Issuer characteristics      
log $ deal size  0.008 0.028***  -0.001 0.019*** 
 0.007 0.007  0.002 0.002 
log issuers $ equity or debt proceeds prior 5 years  0.005 0.010**  0.006*** 0.015*** 
 0.003 0.003  0.002 0.002 
Diagnostics      
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 109.1***  1,445***  1,422***  8,895*** 
Heckmans λ (probability of non-coverage) 0.039* 0.025  0.071*** 0.126*** 
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 4.0* 1.5  54.9** 166.7*** 
  
Table VIII. Lead Bank Choice, Equity Transactions. 
We estimate the probability that a particular bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular equity deal using probit MLE with sample 
selection correction. The results for the associated selection equation are illustrated in Table VI. Specification 1 uses relative 
recommendations and Specification 2 uses relative upgrades to model analyst behavior. These are instrumented from the models 
estimated in Table VII and so treated as endogenous. Analyst behavior is observed only if the bank provides coverage, so we 
estimate the probability of winning a deal separately if the bank provides research coverage and if it does not. The dummies for 
mergers and staff arrivals/departures are coded 1 in the quarter of the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three quarters. Intercepts 
are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. Where necessary, they are based on the Murphy-Topel adjustment. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The columns headed Test show the 
significance of Wald tests comparing the coefficients in the coverage and no-coverage cases. The number of covered and non-
covered observations is 11,006 and 131,120, respectively. 
 
 Coverage    Test 
 Spec. 1  Spec. 2  
No 
coverage  
rel. to 
Spec. 1
rel. to 
Spec. 2
Analyst behavior     
relative recommendations -1.596    
 1.719    
relative upgrades  -0.184***   
  0.056   
Bank-issuer relationships     
banks share of issuers debt deals prior 5 years 0.860*** 0.613*** 1.224*** *** *** 
 0.241 0.080 0.060   
banks share of issuers equity deals prior 5 years 2.140*** 1.933*** 1.900*** ***  
 0.097 0.058 0.059   
banks share of issuers loans prior 5 years 0.871*** 0.711*** 0.600*** **  
 0.276 0.174 0.091   
=1 if bank owns equity in issuer 0.192* 0.070 0.133*** * * 
 0.098 0.051 0.025   
dummy: bank involved in merger  -0.197 0.022 0.170*** *** ** 
 0.297 0.097 0.048   
dummy: equity staff have departed -0.100 -0.124 -0.113*   
 0.124 0.088 0.049   
dummy: equity staff have arrived -0.229 -0.130 0.132*** *** *** 
 0.171 0.089 0.041   
Bank and analyst characteristics     
=1 if analyst is ranked all-star by Institutional Investor 0.079 0.071*    
 0.053 0.036    
log analysts seniority (in years) 0.073* 0.052*    
 0.034 0.022    
banks equity market share prior calendar year 2.518 2.206*** 2.210***   
 1.892 0.488 0.245   
banks debt market share prior calendar year 0.781 0.692 0.309   
 1.660 0.513 0.257   
banks loan market share prior calendar year -0.917 -1.062* -2.694*** *** *** 
 0.944 0.521 0.254   
Diagnostics    
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 2,258***  2,347***  2,255***   
Correlation of coverage and lead-bank equations (ρ) 0.385***  0.418***  0.282***   
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 88.9***  116.4***  43.0***   
  
Table IX. Lead Bank Choice, Debt Transactions. 
We estimate the probability that a particular bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular debt deal using probit MLE with sample 
selection correction. The results for the associated selection equation are illustrated in Table VI. Specification 1 uses relative 
recommendations and Specification 2 uses relative upgrades to model analyst behavior. These are instrumented from the models 
estimated in Table VII and so treated as endogenous. Analyst behavior is observed only if the bank provides coverage, so we 
estimate the probability of winning a deal separately if the bank provides research coverage and if it does not. The dummies for 
mergers and staff arrivals/departures are coded 1 in the quarter of the event, and ½, ⅓, and ¼ in the next three quarters. Intercepts 
are not shown. Standard errors are shown in italics. Where necessary, they are based on the Murphy-Topel adjustment. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The columns headed Test show the 
significance of Wald tests comparing the coefficients in the coverage and no-coverage cases. The number of covered and non-
covered observations is 55,320 and 201,489, respectively. 
 
 Coverage    Test 
 Spec. 1  Spec. 2  
No 
coverage  
rel. to 
Spec. 1
rel. to 
Spec. 2
Analyst behavior     
relative recommendations -0.554**    
 0.209    
relative upgrades  -0.042   
  0.028   
Bank-issuer relationships     
banks share of issuers debt deals prior 5 years 1.910*** 1.762*** 2.009*** ** *** 
 0.069 0.038 0.032   
banks share of issuers equity deals prior 5 years 0.599*** 0.540*** 0.473*** **  
 0.045 0.037 0.046   
banks share of issuers loans prior 5 years 1.652*** 1.324*** 1.158*** *** *** 
 0.168 0.103 0.042   
=1 if bank owns equity in issuer 0.008 -0.039 -0.190*** *** *** 
 0.031 0.022 0.015   
dummy: bank involved in merger 0.078 0.135** 0.032  ** 
 0.059 0.052 0.036   
dummy: debt staff have departed -0.059 -0.023 -0.138*** ** *** 
 0.040 0.036 0.027   
dummy: debt staff have arrived 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.145*** *** *** 
 0.037 0.035 0.027   
Bank and analyst characteristics     
=1 if analyst is ranked all-star by Institutional Investor -0.069*** -0.076***    
 0.021 0.020    
log analysts seniority (in years) 0.049*** 0.041**    
 0.014 0.014    
banks equity market share prior calendar year -0.999*** -0.810*** -1.738*** *** *** 
 0.269 0.246 0.208   
banks debt market share prior calendar year 6.818*** 6.217*** 5.381*** *** *** 
 0.377 0.286 0.201   
banks loan market share prior calendar year 1.422** 0.648* 2.903*** *** *** 
 0.486 0.315 0.147   
Diagnostics    
Wald test: all coefficients = 0 (χ2) 4,854***  4,864***  8,930***   
Correlation of coverage and lead-bank equations (ρ) 0.122***  0.124***  0.058**   
Likelihood ratio test of independent equations (ρ=0) (χ2) 24.6***  25.4***  6.1*   
  
Table X. Differences Over Time and Interaction Results. 
As in Tables VIII and IX, we estimate the probability that a particular bank is chosen to lead-manage a particular deal using probit 
MLE with sample selection correction. In Panel A, we partition the sample into two periods, 1993-1997 and 1998-June 2002. To 
model analyst behavior, we instrument relative recommendations and relative upgrades from auxiliary models similar to those 
reported in Table VII, but estimated within each sub-period. To conserve space, we report only the coefficients and Murphy-Topel 
corrected standard errors for the instrumented analyst behavior variables. In Panel B, we use the entire 1993-June 2002 estimation 
sample as in Tables VII through IX, but interact the instrumented analyst behavior variables with a dummy equaling one for firms 
maintaining relatively weak underwriting relationships (see text for definition). In Panel C, we interact instead with a measure of 
the firms switching propensity to see if analyst behavior has a larger impact on companies that are more prone to switching 
underwriters. We obtain a proxy for a firms switching propensity from an auxiliary probit that estimates, deal-by-deal and 
separately for debt and equity deals, the likelihood that the firm chooses a different underwriter from the one that lead-managed its 
previous deal, as a function of the firms maturity (log years since equity IPO), the weak-relationship dummy from Panel B, and 
the log size of the deal. For debt deals, we add a dummy equaling 1 if the deal involves high-yield bonds. We use ***, **, * and  to 
denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 Equity  Debt 
 
Relative 
recommend-
ations 
Relative 
upgrades  
Relative 
recommend-
ations 
Relative 
upgrades 
      
Panel A: Sub-periods      
1993-1997 0.259 -0.118  -0.572* -0.052 
 0.747 0.084  0.274 0.048 
      
1998-June 2002 -1.784 -0.172*  -0.322† -0.044 
 4.161 0.070  0.187 0.038 
      
      
Panel B:     
Analyst behavior -1.110 -0.248***  -0.467* -0.008 
 1.111 0.065  0.208 0.032 
          
 x dummy (low relationship intensity) -1.090* 0.256*  -0.328* -0.178** 
 0.556 0.125  0.143 0.070 
      
      
Panel C:     
Analyst behavior -0.373 -0.426**  0.428 0.321* 
 0.614 0.142  0.366 0.150 
      
 x switching propensity -1.869*** 0.443†  -1.839*** -0.703* 
 0.584 0.233  0.572 0.285 
      
 
